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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
U.C.A. § 49-11-613 allows a member who is apprieved by a decision of the Utah
State Retirement Board ("Board") to "obtain judicial review by complying with the
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act."
U.C.A. §63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative hearings. U.C.A.
§78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure confer jurisdiction
on the Court of Appeals over the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the Board reasonably determine that Petitioner failed to qualify for
long-term disability benefits by using the AMA and Utah Impairment Guidelines
as reasonable standards to determine an "objective medical impairment?"

2.

Did the Board reasonably admit and consider all of Petitioner's
evidence?

3.

Did substantial evidence exist to support the admission and
persuasiveness of Dr. Knorpp's testimony?

4.

Did the Board's Order reasonably determine all necessary issues and
comply with the requirements of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16(4) specifically enumerates the relief which this Court may grant on an appeal
from a formal administrative hearing before the Board. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)
states:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of
the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by one of the
following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any
statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decisionmaking process,, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Mrs. Malan ("Petitioner") failed to point to any specific subsection for relief under
Section 63-46b-16(4) where the Board erred. The Utah Court of Appeals has duly noted
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that "Because the standard of review under UAPA will vary based on the subsection the
claim is brought under, we strongly encourage counsel to clearly identify under what
section review is being sought and to make certain they identify the appropriate standard
of review under that section." King v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281,1287
n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(Emphasis added).
On issues of fact, "[a]n agency's findings of fact... are accorded substantial
deference and will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another
conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Murphy v. State Retirement Board, 2004
Ut. App. 109, *1 (Ut. Ct. App. 2004), cert, denied, (July 19, 2004); quoting. Hurley v.
Board of Review of Industrial Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). "Substantial
evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Id; quoting, Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63,
68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quotations and citations omitted). The Appellate Court does not
conduct a de novo credibility determination or reweigh the evidence. Questar Pipeline
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). Nor will an agency's
findings of fact be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion
from the evidence is permissible. Hurley, 767 P.2d 524 at 526-27. It is the province of
the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the agency to draw
the inference. Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).
3

Similarly, the Appellate Court will grant deference to the agency's interpretation or
application of law when "there is a grant of discretion to the agency concerning the
language in question, either expressly made in the statute or implied from the statutory
language." Morton Int'n., Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991).
"Where a grant exists, [the Appellate Court] will not disturb the agency's interpretation or
application of the law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality." King, 850 P.2d 1281 at 1286. The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted
such a grant of discretion broadly. See, Id., at 1288 (After reviewing examples of grants
of discretion to agencies, the Court states, "In each case the language of the statute and
the statutory scheme support a finding of at least an implicit grant of discretion.").
Here, the legislature granted to the Board's Long-Term Disability Program under
U.C.A. § 49-21-401(3) the specific authority to "review all relevant information and
determine whether or not the eligible employee is totally disabled." In addition, the
Board maintains the general power to "develop broad policy for the . .. various . . .
programs under broad discretion . . ., including the specific authority to interpret and
define any provision or term under this title . . . [.]" U.C.A. § 49-1 l-203(l)(k). Thus,
since the legislature granted express authority to the Board to determine whether an
eligible employee meets the statutory definition of "total disability", this Court should not
disturb the Board's interpretations of law unless they "exceed the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality." King, 850P.2d 1281 at 1286.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 49-21-102(1 l)(a)
"Total disability" or "totally disabled," means, the complete inability, due to
objective medical impairment, whether physical or mental, to engage in the
eligible employee's regular occupation during the elimination period and
the first 24 months of disability benefits.
Utah Code Ann. §49-21-102(6)
"Objective medical impairment" means an impairment resulting from an
injury or illness which is diagnosed by a physician and which is based on
accepted objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective
complaints.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner filed a Request for Board Action on August 26, 2003, requesting the Utah
State Retirement Board (Hereinafter "the Board") grant her a two-year own-occupation
disability benefit. See, Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR") at 5-6. A hearing was held on
May 6th and June 1st, 2004, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer (hereinafter "H.O.")
on Petitioner's Request for Board Action. Petitioner was represented by Loren Lambert.
The Board was represented by David B. Hansen. At the conclusion of the testimony, the
H.O. requested closing arguments to be submitted via written briefs. See, Hearing
Transcript (hereinafter "HT") at 383:14-17. Petitioner's Written Closing Argument was
submitted on July 12, 2004. See, HR at 231. Respondent's Closing Argument was
submitted on August 9, 2004. See, HR at 298. Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's
Closing Argument was submitted on August 23, 2004. See, HR at 329. TheH.O.'s
5

Decision upholding the Long Term Disability Program's (hereinafter "LTD Program")
denial of benefits was submitted on September 14, 2004. See, HR at 374. A Final Order
was signed by the H.O. on October 15, 2004. See, HR at 381. The Board adopted the
Order on October 21, 2004. See, Id. Petitioner filed her Petition for Review in this
matter on November 5, 2004.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1.

Petitioner worked as an employee of the State of Utah as a Health Program
Specialist II. See, HR, at 221 (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B-15, at 166).

2.

Petitioner testified that her last day of work with the State of Utah as a Health
Program Specialist II was October 1, 2002. See, TR. 173:13-15.

3.

Petitioner presented into evidence a job description from the State of Utah which
indicates that her position as a Health Program Specialist II was a sedentary position.
See, HR, at 221 (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B-15). The physical demands of this
position consisted primarily of sitting and included some walking, standing,
bending, and carrying light items. See, Id, (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B-15 at
166-167).

4.

On August 26, 2003, Petitioner applied for a two-year own occupation long-term
disability benefit with the Public Employee's Health Program's LTD Program.

5.

The LTD Program formally denied Petitioner's application for a two-year own
occupation long-term disability benefit because she failed to show she suffers from
6

an objective medical impairment preventing her from performing her regular
occupation.
6.

A hearing was held on Petitioner's claim for disability benefits on May 6 and June
1st, 2004, before the Board's Adjudicative H.O..

7.

Both Petitioner and Dr. Landon Beales, Petitioner's expert witness, testified at the
hearing that the worst conditions Petitioner suffers from are pain and fatigue. See,
TR. 21:17-18, 22:7, 18-23, 177: 11-25, 178:1-13. Dr. Beales testified, "There's no
good objective measurement of pain, or fatigue..." and claimed he relied solely on
Petitioner's self-reported symptoms in forming his opinion on her disability due to
pain and fatigue. TR.360:12-13.

8.

Petitioner was also diagnosed with sleep apnea and lumbar degenerative disc
disease. See, TR. 350:21-25, 29:4. However, she failed to provide any evidence
that she was objectively impaired due to these conditions.

9.

Dr. Beales testified that he was not familiar with either the American Medical
Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment ("AMA
Guidelines") or the Utah Impairment Guidelines. See, TR. 59:15-19, 60: 8-10.

10.

Dr. Beales failed to provide Petitioner with an impairment rating using any accepted
objective criteria, such as the AMA, or Utah Impairment Guidelines.

11.

Dr. Scott Knorpp M.D. is board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation.
See, HR, at 135. Dr. Knorpp is proficient with the AMA Guidelines and the Utah
Impairment Guidelines in determining impairment. See, TR. 65:15-16. Dr. Knorpp
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testified that based upon these guidelines, as well as the disability standard defined
in Title 49 of the Utah Code, he could not find anything that could objectively show
that Petitioner would qualify for an impairment that would lead to a disability. See,
TR. 105:18-21,25, 106:1.
12.

Dr. Scott Knorpp's testimony concerning Petitioner's alleged impairment and
disability was credible and persuasive. Dr. Knorpp affirmatively testified that
Petitioner did not meet the definition of "total disability," under the definition in
Utah Code Ann. §49-21-102(11). See,TR. 105:18-21,25, 106:1.

13.

Petitioner submitted into evidence a Neuropsychological Evaluation performed on
her on February 20, 2003, by Dr. Elaine Clark, a licensed psychologist. See HR, at
221 (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B-11). Dr. Clark concluded, "this evaluation
failed to provide any evidence that would suggest Mrs. Hilton is disabled from work

14.

for psychological or cognitive reasons." Id. (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B-11 at
135-136).

15.

No evidence was presented by Petitioner to indicate that she qualifies for an
objective impairment rating pursuant to the AM A Guidelines, the Utah Impairment
Guidelines, or any other accepted objective criteria.

16.

The H.O. reviewed and considered all of Petitioner's medical records in making his
determination and order.

2

Petitioner used the surname "Malan" at the time of the hearing. At the time of Dr.
Clark's report, Petitioner went by the name "Hilton".
8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The Board reasonably denied Petitioner long-term disability benefits under U.C. A.
Title 49, because Petitioner failed to prove that she suffered from any "objective
medical impairment" which would prevent her from performing her regular
occupation as a sedentary worker. An "objective medical impairment" must be
proven through "accepted medical tests or findings" under U.C.A. § 49-21-102(6).
The Board reasonably found that the accepted medical standards in the community
for determining an impairment are the AMA and Utah Impairment Guidelines.
These impairment guidelines assign no impairment rating to Petitioner's diagnoses
of fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome. In addition, Petitioner failed to
prove any objective medical impairment under these guidelines for her other
diagnoses. Thus, because Petitioner failed to prove any "objective medical
impairment" using "accepted medical tests or findings" the Board reasonably
denied her long-term disability benefits.

2.

The Board received substantial evidence that Dr. Knorpp's testimony was credible
and persuasive. Dr. Knorpp is an expert in physical medicine and rehabilitation.
At the request of the Board's Long-Term Disability Program, Dr. Knorpp
conducted an independent medical examination of Petitioner. These types of
examinations are specifically contemplated in U.C.A. § 49-21-401(8), and are the
standard in the disability insurance industry to assist a trier of fact in determining
9

alleged impairment and disability.
In this case, Dr. Knorpp's examination consisted of a through review of the
provided medical records, an interview with Petitioner regarding her medical
history and subjective complaints, and a complete physical examination. Dr.
Knorpp's examination report opined that Petitioner did not suffer from any
objective medical impairment, and she did not qualify for disability. Thus,
because the Board received substantial evidence that Dr. Knorpp's opinion was
credible and persuasive, the Board committed no error in reliance on Dr. Knorrp's
testimony.
The Board properly admitted and considered all of Petitioner's evidence in finding
Petitioner failed to meet the statutory standard for "total disability" under U.C.A. §
49-21-102(1 l)(a). Petitioner points to nothing in the record which suggests that
the Board or its Hearing Officer failed to admit or consider all of her evidence and
arguments. That the Hearing Officer did not find Petitioner's evidence persuasive
does not mean that he failed to consider her evidence or arguments.
The Board's Order was consistent with the Hearing Officer's Decision. In his
Decision, the Hearing Officer clearly ruled on the ultimate issue, whether
Petitioner was entitled to long-term disability benefits. Also in his Decision, the
Hearing Officer requested that the Board's Counsel to prepare an Order consistent
with the Decision. After the proposed Order was prepared, Petitioner took the
opportunity to object to the proposed Order in writing. Thus, Petitioner was
10

provided a valid opportunity to complain that the Hearing Officer's Decision was
inconsistent with his Order, prior to the Order's adoption by the Board. Since the
Hearing Officer and the Board adopted the Order without changes, one must
assume, without evidence to the contrary, that the Order complied with the
Hearing Officer's reasoning.
In addition, Petitioner cannot point to one specific instance where the Hearing
Officer's Decision was inconsistent with the Board's Order. Inconsistencies are
more than merely word additions, they must include fundamentally different facts
or legal reasoning as the basis for the Decision. Again, because the Hearing
Officer adopted the proposed Order after considering the Petitioner's objections,
the presumption is that the Order was consistent with the Decision.

11

ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT SHE MEETS THE STATUTORY
STANDARD FOR RECEIVING LONG-TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS UNDER
UTAH CODE ANN. §49-21-102(11)(A).

Petitioner did not prove that she meets the statutory standard for receiving longterm disability benefits under Utah Code Ann. §49-21-102(1 l)(a). In order to qualify for
long-term disability benefits under this standard, Petitioner must prove that she suffers
from an "objective medical impairment" which prevents her from performing her "regular
occupation." Petitioner failed to meet this burden.
A. PETITIONER MAINTAINS THE BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER U.CA. §49-11613(4) TO SHOW SHE SUFFERS FROM AN "OBJECTIVE MEDICAL
IMPAIRMENT" WHICH PREVENTS HER FROM PERFORMING HER
REGULAR OCCUPATION.

The burden of proof rests squarely upon Petitioner to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that she suffers from an "objective medical impairment" which prevents her
from performing her regular occupation. Petitioner failed to meet this burden.
Petitioner brought this action under U.CA.§49-11-613(4) which states, "the
moving party in any proceeding brought under this section shall bear the burden of
proof." Pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals in Murphy,3 "the plain language of section

3 In Murphy, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Utah State Retirement
Board's denial of Petitioner's request for permanent and total long-term disability
benefits. The basis for Ms. Murphy's claim for disability before the Board was that she
was impaired due to fibromyaligia. In fact, Murphy's treating physician, Dr. Bateman, is
also Petitioner's treating physician.
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49-l-610(4)4 clearly imposes the burden of proof on (Petitioner) to demonstrate that she
has a "total disability."" Murphy v. State Retirement Board, 2004 Ut. App. 109, at *2.
Although the Board submitted documents and provided expert testimony that
provided ample support for denying Petitioner's request for long-term disability benefits,
the Board need not submit any evidence in order to prevail. Yet in order for Petitioner to
prevail she must prove that she suffers from an "objective medical impairment," and due
solely to this impairment, that she is unable to perform her "regular occupation."
Petitioner did not meet her burden.
B. THE HEARING OFFICER REASONABLY DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO PROVE AN "OBJECTIVE MEDICAL IMPAIRMENT" THROUGH
"ACCEPTED OBJECTIVE MEDICAL TESTS OR FINDINGS" UNDER U.C.A. §

49-21-102(6).
Because Petitioner failed to prove any "objective medical impairment" under
U.C.A. § 49-21-102(6), the H.O. correctly found that Petitioner did not meet the statutory
standard to receive long-term disability benefits. Under the standard of review, the Court
should give substantial deference to the Board's findings of fact, and will not overturn the
Board's decision if based on "substantial evidence." See, Murphy v. State Retirement
Board, 2004 Ut. App. 109 at *1. Similarly, in reviewing the Board's conclusions of law,
the Court should only reverse if the Board's interpretation of law "exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality." King, 850 P.2d 1281 at 1286. This is particularly true
when, as here, the Board is interpreting an agency specific statute. See, Morton, 814 P.2d

4 U.C.A.§49-1-610 was renumbered in 2002. It is now numbered as U.C.A.§49-11-613.
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581 at 589.
Eligible employees qualify to receive disability benefits under the Board's LongTerm Disability Program ("LTD Program") when they meet the definition of "Total
Disability" under U.C.A. § 49-21-102(1 l)(a), which states, "Total disability5 means, the
complete inability, due to objective medical impairment, whether physical or mental, to
engage in the eligible employee's regular occupation during the elimination period and
the first 24 months of disability benefits." (Emphasis added). U.C.A. § 49-21-102(6) then
defines "Objective Medical Impairment" as "an impairment resulting from an illness or
injury which is diagnosed by a physician and which is based on accepted objective
medical tests or findings rather than subjective complaints." U.C.A. §49-21-102(6).
(Emphasis added). While Petitioner's brief points to no specific language in the Board's
Order which she deems to be in error in regards to the law on "impairment", the relevant
portion of the Board's Order regarding the issue of impairment are Findings of Fact
paragraphs 7 and 8, and Conclusions of Law paragraphs 9, 11 and 12 which state:
7.

8.

Dr. Beales testified that he was not familiar with either the
American Medical Association Guidelines to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairment ("AMA Guidelines") or the Utah
Impairment Guidelines. See, JR. 59:15-19, 60:8-10. Dr.
Beales did not provide any other guidelines or standards that
could be used in making his determination on Petitioner's
disability.
Dr. Beales failed to provide Petitioner with an impairment
rating using any accepted objective criteria, such as the AMA
or Utah Impairment Guidelines. Impairment ratings are the
standard used in the medical community to determine
disability. See, TR. 60:1-7.
14

9.

Petitioner failed to present any non-hearsay evidence proving
she suffered from any "objective medical impairment"
resulting from an injury or illness based on accepted medical
tests or findings. Although Petitioner provided evidence of
diagnoses, Petitioner failed to provide any evidence showing
that she was objectively impaired due to these conditions.

11.

Although it is not mandatory that a petitioner use the AMA
Guidelines and/or the Utah Impairment Guidelines to prove
impairment, a petitioner must prove "objective medical
impairment" through "accepted objective medical tests or
findings." Since the AMA Guidelines and the Utah
Impairment Guidelines are the standards currently used by the
medical community to determine impairment, these are
reasonable guidelines to be used to determine the level of
impairment.
No evidence was presented by Petitioner to indicate that she
qualifies for an objective impairment rating pursuant to the
AMA Guidelines, the Utah Impairment Guidelines, or any
other accepted objective criteria.

12.

HR., at 382-386.
1. T H E BOARD REASONABLY USED THE AMA AND UTAH IMPAIRMENT
GUIDELINES IN REQUIRING PETITIONER TO SHOW AN "OBJECTIVE
MEDICAL IMPAIRMENT."

The Board's Findings of Fact regarding impairment were supported by "substantial
evidence", and the Board's Conclusions of Law requiring the use of the medically
acceptable American Medical Association ("AMA") Guidelines and Utah Impairment
Guidelines were both reasonable and rational. In determining whether an eligible
employee has an "objective medical impairment", the H.O. must determine what
"accepted medical tests or findings" are appropriate to determine impairment. In this
case, as in other previous long-term disability cases, expert testimony was received which
15

states that the Utah Impairment Guidelines are the accepted medical standard used in the
community to determine impairment. HT. 104:1-5 While an "impairment rating" is not
required by the statute, an "objective medical impairment" using "accepted medical tests
or findings" is required.
Although the Utah Impairment Guidelines were developed5 for use in Worker's
Compensation cases,6 the guidelines are not limited to such cases. As Dr. Knorpp
testified, "[The Utah Impairment Guidelines are] used for issues of classifying disability
for any worker . . . [The Utah Impairment Guidelines are] equally applicable for all
jurisdictions." HT. 104:6-14 Even still, the Board in its Order recognized that the AMA
and Utah Impairment Guidelines are not statutory guidelines, and the Board is not bound
by these guidelines. See, HR. at 386. However, even Petitioner recognizes (See,
Appellant's Brief at 25) that the Board must provide some objective basis for its findings.
These Guidelines allow for such an objective basis.
Since the Guidelines are the accepted standard in the medical community for
determining impairment, the Board was reasonable in requiring Petitioner to either prove
an objective medical impairment under these guidelines, or provide evidence of some
other medically accepted objective criteria in which to measure impairment. Petitioner

5 The Utah Impairment Guidelines are to be used in tandem with the AMA Guidelines to
determine impairment. See, HR. at 372.
6 Petitioner provides no evidence or even suggests that the AMA Impairment Guidelines
only have applicability to Worker's Compensation cases.
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argues for the first time in this appeal 7 that the Board should have used the American
Association of Disability Evaluating Physicians ("AADEP") and the Social Security
Administration ("SSA") "guidelines" as medically accepted criteria to determine
impairment. See, Appellant's Brief at 29. However, the Board received no evidence that
these "guidelines"8 are "medically acceptable." One would expect that in order to adopt
Petitioner's alleged criteria, some smidgen of medical testimony would have to be
received supporting the use of this criteria as medically acceptable. That is why the
Board was correct in focusing on Petitioner's expert witness in determining that "Dr.
Beales did not provide any other guidelines or standards that could be used in making his
determination on Petitioner's disability[,]" and "Dr. Beales failed to provide Petitioner
with an impairment rating using any accepted objective criteria . . .." HR. at 383.
(Emphasis added.)
Because Petitioner failed to prove any objective medical impairment under the

7 This is the first time Petitioner has presented this argument, typically in order to
preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the prior trier of fact so that it
may have an opportunity to rule on the issue.
8 AADEP and SSA do not really provide guidelines for determining impairment. The
irony of Petitioner pointing to the AADEP "guidelines" is that even under this standard,
Petitioner would not qualify for any "objective medical impairment." The AADEP paper
submitted by Petitioner states, "Must use AMA Guidelines." In contrast, SSA does not
use any medically acceptable "guidelines" but instead relies on the common law
interpretation of the statutory definition of "medically determinable impairment" as its
standard. Since the Utah Legislature in 2002 changed the applicable definition for the
LTD Program from "medically determinable impairment" to "objective medical
impairment", presumably the Legislature did not want the LTD Program to use the SSA
common law as persuasive authority.
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AMA or Utah Impairment Guidelines, and because Petitioner provided no other medically
acceptable objective basis for measuring impairment, the Board's conclusion that the
AMA and Utah Guidelines "are reasonable guidelines to be used to determine the level of
impairment" was correct and reasonable.

C. T H E BOARD CORRECTLY APPLIED THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURES ACT HEARSAY RULES, AND CORRECTLY FOUND NO NONHEARSAY EVIDENCE OF AN "OBJECTIVE MEDICAL IMPAIRMENT"
UNDER THE AMA OR UTAH IMPAIRMENT GUIDELINES.
The Board's Conclusion of Law paragraph 9 correctly applied and interpreted the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA") hearsay rules in finding, "Petitioner
failed to present any non-hearsay evidence proving she suffered from any 'objective
medical impairment' resulting from an injury or illness based on accepted medical tests or
findings. Although Petitioner provided evidence of diagnoses, Petitioner failed to provide
any evidence showing that she was objectively impaired due to these conditions." HR. at
386. In addition, the Board's conclusion that Petitioner has no "objective medical
impairment" was reasonable. See, Id.
1.

PETITIONER'S MEDICAL RECORDS CONSISTING OF OPINIONS
REGARDING IMPAIRMENT AND DISABILITY ARE HEARSAY.

Any out of court "statement... offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted" is
hearsay pursuant to the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(c). Statements from medical
professions which opine on impairment or disability, even if contained within medical
records are hearsay. Petitioner attempts to argue that her medical records are an
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exception to the hearsay rules. See, Appellant's Brief, at 27. In support of this argument
Petitioner points to Utah Rules of Evidence 803(4) which states,
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonable pertinent to diagnosis and treatment.
(emphasis added.) This exception to the hearsay rule clearly provides that only,
"statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment," are an exception to
hearsay. This rule does not make any mention regarding opinions of medical experts
regarding impairment or disability.
In addition, nothing in the hearing record suggests that the H.O. failed to consider
Petitioner's medical records regarding her diagnosis or treatment.9 However, the H.O.
was correct in determining that the opinions regarding impairment and disability in
Petitioner's records were hearsay. Therefore, the exception to hearsay in URE 803(4)
does not apply to Petitioner's submitted opinions regarding impairment and disability,
these opinions are clearly hearsay.
2.

PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE ANY "OBJECTIVE MEDICAL
IMPAIRMENT" BECAUSE EITHER HER DIAGNOSES RESULTED
FROM HER SUBJECTIVE COMPLAINTS RATHER THAN MEDICAL
TESTS OR FINDINGS, OR HER DIAGNOSES DO NOT CAUSE
IMPAIRMENT.

An "objective medical impairment" cannot be founded on subjective complaints or

9 As far as the Board can determine, no dispute exists between the parties that hearsay is
admissible in administrative hearings under UAPA. However, hearsay evidence cannot
be the sole basis for a finding of fact. See, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10(3).
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mild diagnoses. Petitioner's allegations of "impairment" are really nothing more than
evidence of diagnoses. The Board recognized this and stated, "Although Petitioner
provided evidence of diagnoses, Petitioner failed to provide any evidence showing that
she was objectively impaired due to these conditions." HR. at 385. A diagnosis is not an
objective medical impairment. The Petitioner must prove that her diagnoses of illness or
injury prevents her from performing some function. Petitioner failed to do this.
Petitioner points to some alleged "impairments", none of which are truly
impairments. See, Appellant's Brief at 24. First, Petitioner argues that she suffers from
the diagnoses of "fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS), [and] chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS).
.." See, Id. Neither of these diagnoses constitutes an objective medical impairment
because they are based on Petitioner's subjective complaints rather than accepted
objective medical tests or findings. Id. In addition to these diagnoses, Petitioner alleges
she is "impaired" by sleep apnea, DDE), mild neuropathy, and cognitive problems. See,
Id., at 30. These diagnoses also do not qualify for an "objective medical impairment"
because they were not proven to functionally "impair" Petitioner in any way from
performing her regular occupation.
a.

FMS AND CFS ARE NOT RATABLE IMPAIRMENTS.

Neither FMS nor CFS qualify as a ratable diagnoses under the AMA or the Utah
Guidelines. The Utah Impairment Guides state:
The diagnoses of fibromyalgia, CFS, and myofascial pain
syndromes are based on an individual's report of widespread
subjective pain and reports of tenderness during physical
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examination. Despite extensive research, no specific underlying
biological abnormality has been discovered to explain the reports of
these people. In that the medical community has not achieved
consensus on how to construe such condition, these conditions are
not to be rated. (Emphasis added.)
HR, at 224.
Therefore, pursuant to accepted guidelines in the Utah medical community the
diagnoses of FMS and CFS are not ratable diagnoses. This explanation of "impairment"
for CFS and FMS excludes any finding of an "objective medical impairment" under Title
49 because they are based on symptoms of self-reported pain and fatigue. Under
U.C.A.§49-21-102(6), an "objective medical impairment" must be based on "accepted
objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective complaints." Similar to the Utah
Impairment Guidelines, the American Academy of Disability Evaluating Physicians
("AADEP") defines FMS as, "not a discrete disorder, nor a disease, but a group of
symptoms and physical findings that occur together frequently- a syndrome." HR, at
183. AADEP also states, "the key feature of the potential common fibromyalgia
impairments is that they are all based on self report. .. Just as a diagnosis of fibromyalgia
is not necessary in order for there to be a finding of impairment, neither is a diagnosis or
fibromyalgia sufficient for determination of impairment." Id. at 184.
The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, " . . . fibromyalgia's cause or
causes are unknown, there is no cure, and, of greatest importance to disability law, its
symptoms are entirely subjective." Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. Welfare Benefit
Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 2004). The court stated, ".. . [T]he Mayo Clinic states
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that the syndrome is neither 'progressive' nor 'crippling,' the symptoms can be worse at
some times than others." Id., at 872, n.6 and n.7. Finally, the 9th Circuit confirmed that
"objective tests are administered to rule out other diseases, but not establish the presence
or absence of fibromyalgia." Id., at n.8. The National Center for Infectious Diseases has
defined CFS "as self-reported persistent or relapsing fatigue of 6 or more consecutive
months." Id. (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B-17, at 5) (Emphasis added.). These
definitions of FMS and CFS, exclude any finding of an "objective medical impairment"
due to FMS and CFS because they are based on findings of symptoms and self-reported
pain. An "objective medical impairment" must be based on accepted objective medical
tests or findings rather than subjective complaints. Therefore, Petitioner claims of
impairment under the diagnoses for FMS and CFS do not qualify as an "objective medical
impairment" under Title 49.
Even one of Petitioner's own physicians fails to objectify an impairment due to
FMS and CFS. Dr. Richard Call who originally diagnosed Petitioner with FMS states,
"Linda has Fibromyalgia Syndrome. In as much as it is for the most part subjectively
defined, it is very difficult to dictate disease course or disability in as must as the
disability is variable. An objective basis of disability determinations is extremely
difficult." Id. (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B-13, at 146). Dr. Beales, Petitioner's expert
witness, was questioned regarding this statement from Dr. Call, and he answered that he
generally agrees with this statement. 111. 360: 3-9. Additionally, Dr. Beales testified that
he collaborated with Dr. Call on many occasions, and he is well acquainted with FMS.
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TR. 360 18-23. Dr. Beales acknowledges that he agrees with another physician he
considers an expert in working with FMS, that it is a disease which is subjectively
defined, and any type of disability determination is difficult. Even though Dr. Beales
labels Petitioner as "disabled," he never objectively defined a "medical impairment"
which was not based solely on Petitioner's self reported symptoms. Additionally, Dr.
Beales failed to give Petitioner any type of impairment rating, or suggest any other way to
objectively define her alleged impairment or disability.
Dr. Beales testified that the major most disabling symptoms of FMS and CFS are
fatigue and muscle pain, neither of which can be objectively verified or measured. TR.
21:17-18, 22: 7, 18-23. In reference to objectively measuring pain and fatigue, Dr.
Beales testified that "there's no good objective measurement of pain, of fatigue . .." TR.
360:12-13. When Dr. Beales was questioned about what objective criteria or medical
evidence he used to establish that Petitioner has chronic pain, he answered that he used
the medical history from Petitioner and tested her for tender points. TR. 55:15-21. Dr.
Beales stated that he could tell that Petitioner was in pain when examining Petitioner if
her response to pushing on the tender points was that she was in pain or that she hurts.
TR. 55:22-23, 56: 10-13. In reality, Dr. Beales could only report Petitioners reported
reactions of pain and could not objectify the pain itself.
When Dr. Beales was questioned about what objective criteria or medical evidence
he used to establish that Petitioner has CFS he answered, "mostly her story and the
patterns she gave . .." TR. 56: 17-19. Finally, when Counsel asked, "so it was based on
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her reported symptoms of fatigue that you established that; is that right?" Dr. Beales
answered, "Yes." TR. 57:4-6. Thus, the testimony of Dr. Beales plainly shows that he
cannot objectively measure the two worst symptoms that Petitioner suffers from, which
are also two of the main symptoms of FMS and CFS, cannot be objectively measured.
These symptoms are based solely on Petitioner's statements. As such, Petitioner's claim
of objective medical impairment for FMS and CFS fails to meet the statutory standard.
No accepted medical test exists to objectively verify FMS or CFS. The diagnosis
must be based upon Petitioner's statements that she is in pain and suffers from fatigue.
Petitioner failed to provide and cannot provide any medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques to support claims that she suffers from an objective
medical impairment due to FMS and CFS. As such, Petitioner does not qualify for an
objective medical impairment and long-term disability benefits must be denied.
In sum, FMS and CFS, by their very definition, do not meet the criteria of an
"objective medical impairment" under Utah law. Neither the medically accepted AM A
Guidelines nor Utah Impairment Guidelines give an impairment rating for FMS and CFS.
Petitioner failed to show that there are other guidelines to use as a basis for determining
impairment based upon a diagnosis of FMS and CFS. Thus, Petitioner has failed to show
that she suffers from an objective medical impairment due to FMS or CFS.
b. PETITIONER'S DIAGNOSES OF SLEEP APNEA, DEGENERATIVE DISC
DISEASE (DDD), NEUROPATHY AND COGNITIVE PROBLEMS DO NOT
SHOW AN OBJECTIVE MEDICAL IMPAIRMENT.

Petitioner also argues that she suffers from the diagnoses of severe sleep apnea,
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degenerative disc disease (DDD), neuropathy and cognitive problems. See, Appellant's
Brief, at 30. However, she failed to prove an objective medical impairment due to these
diagnoses or a combination thereof. Petitioner provided no evidence showing that due to
these conditions she is even impaired, let alone that these impairments render her
disabled.
When Dr. Beales was questioned regarding whether Petitioner is disabled due to
sleep apnea he answered, "Well, I don't think sleep apnea causes disability, per se." TR.
350:21-25. Additionally, Petitioner provides the following from her treating physician,
Dr. Lucinda Bateman, "The abnormalities of sleep architecture and respiration, as
discussed above, would account for clinical symptoms such as nonrestful sleep, daytime
fatigue, and excessive daytime sleepiness." Appellant's Brief, at 32. However, Dr.
Bateman does not provide for a disability based on this conclusion. Dr. Bateman is
merely stating that Petitioner suffers from fatigue and sleepiness. Therefore, based on
Petitioner's own witness's testimony and treating physician's conclusions, she cannot
prove she suffers from an objective medical impairment based on her diagnoses of sleep
apnea.
Dr. Elaine Clark performed a neuropsychological evaluation on Petitioner per the
Board's request on February 20, 2003. See, HR. at 221 (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B11). In her report Dr. Clark states,
. . . there is no evidence that she (Petitioner) would not be able to perform
her job duties as a result of cognitive problems. Although there is evidence
of significant visual memory problems, and some mild verbal learning and
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memory problems, there is no reason to believe that she could not do her
work based on cognitive deficits alone. In fact, this evaluation failed to
provide any evidence that would suggest Mrs. Hilton is disabled from work
for psychological or cognitive reasons.
Id., at 135-136. (emphasis added.)
Therefore, the cognitive test performed on Petitioner by Dr. Clark found that there is no
reason why she could not work based on cognitive problems.
In conclusion, Petitioner failed to present any other evidence which shows that
based on the diagnosis of DDD or neuropathy Petitioner suffers from an objective
medical impairment. Additionally, Petitioner has failed to point to any evidence which
shows that based on the combination of these diagnosis she suffers from an objective
medical impairment. Thus, Petitioner does not suffer from an objective medical
impairment based on the diagnoses of sleep apnea, DDD, neuropathy and cognitive
problems.
D. PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT SHE CAN NO LONGER ENGAGE IN
HER REGULAR OCCUPATION.

Even if Petitioner can prove some impairment, Petitioner failed to prove that she
can no longer engage in her regular occupation. The statutory standard for receiving
disability benefits found in Utah Code Ann. § 49-21-102(1 l)(a), defines "total disability,"
or "totally disabled," as "the complete inability, due to objective medical impairment,
whether physical or mental, to engage in the eligible employee's regular occupation
during the elimination period and the first 24 months of disability benefits."
In order to establish that she meets the standard for "total disability", Petitioner
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must prove that she is unable to engage in her regular occupation due to her physical or
mental impairments. Pursuant to Murphy, the burden of proof is clearly imposed upon
Petitioner to demonstrate that she has a total disability, which includes the inability to
engage in her regular occupation. See, Murphy, 2004 Utah App. 109 (2004), at 3.
1. PETITIONER'S "REGULAR OCCUPATION" WAS A SEDENTARY
POSITION.

Petitioner worked 40 hours per week as a Health Program Specialist II which is a
sedentary type position. See, HR. at 221 (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B-15, at 166). The
physical demands of this position consisted of sitting. See, Id. at 167. Her duties also
included some walking, standing, bending, and carrying light items. See, Id.
2. EVEN GIVEN PETITIONER'S ALLEGED IMPAIRMENTS, SHE COULD
PERFORM HER SEDENTARY REGULAR OCCUPATION.

Petitioner failed to show any physical impairment, psychological impairment, or a
combination of both, which shows that she is not able to work in her position as a Health
Program Specialist II.
In the alternative, if Petitioner is found to have some minor physical ailments,
these ailments, taken separately as well as together, do not qualify for any objective
medical impairment. Neither sleep apnea and lumbar degenerative disc disease nor
cognitive problems completely prevent Petitioner from engaging in her regular
occupation as a Health Program Specialist II. Petitioner's occupation as a Health
Program Specialist II was a sedentary position. See, HR., at 221 (Petitioner's Hearing
Exhibit B-15, at 166). Dr. Knorpp testified that Petitioner could perform sedentary duty
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work given her physical condition. TR. 101:1-3. Likewise, Dr. Elaine Clark stated, "this
evaluation failed to provide any evidence that would suggest Mrs. Hilton is disabled from
work for psychological or cognitive reasons." HR. at 221 (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit
B-ll, at 135-136).
Petitioner relies solely on the testimony of Dr. Beales and the medical records of
Dr. Lucinda Bateman to prove that she is unable to perform her regular occupation. Dr.
Beales gave the following reasons for his opinion that Petitioner could engage in her
regular occupation:
. . . her job description requires her to read and remember; it requires her to
be there at a set time and participate in activities in her department all the
time and she has demonstrated that she's not able to do this and
progressively so, not able to function in this way to a good enough degree
that she would be really acceptable to most managers.
JR. 32:20-25, 33:1.
Dr. Beales never testified he had any expertise in job training and what would be
acceptable to "most managers." Instead, he speaks only generally, when the statute calls
for a specific determination. Dr. Beales stated that he arrived at the conclusion Petitioner
could not work:
based on my experience and based on the history and the patterns that she's
demonstrated and the history that I obtained from her that she would be able
to, in a consistent way, be a reliable employee and be able to perform in a
way that she was expected to do.
TR.34: 12-17.
Again, Dr. Beales relies solely on Petitioner's self-reported symptoms, instead of any
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actual evidence, to determine that Petitioner cannot work. The only evidence presented
from Dr. Bateman regarding Petitioner's ability to work is the following: "she has enough
energy just to take care of basic activities of daily living but not enough to work in any
part time or full time situation." HR. at 221 (Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B-l, at 00).
Neither Dr. Beales nor Dr. Bateman discussed whether or not Petitioner could engage in
her regular occupation due to sleep apnea, DDD, or any other diagnoses.
These opinions given by Dr. Beales and Dr. Bateman of Petitioner's inability to
engage in her regular occupation are generalized statements which give no objective basis
for their reasoning. Dr. Beales testified that the basis for his finding was the history he
obtained from Petitioner. Dr. Bateman did not come and testify at the hearing, and her
opinion also does not include any basis for the determination Petitioner cannot work. Dr.
Bateman merely states that Petitioner does not have enough energy. Additionally, Dr.
Beales stated that he is unfamiliar with the AMA Guidelines for rating impairments for
FMS, nor is he familiar with the Utah Impairment Guidelines. JR. 59:15-19, 60:8-10.
These opinions are not based on any type of objective basis.
In sum, Petitioner has failed to prove that she is unable to work in her sedentary
regular occupation due to either physical impairment, psychological impairments, or a
combination of both. The only evidence Petitioner presented to meet her burden of proof
was the testimony of Dr. Beales who admitted he is unfamiliar with the standards for
determining disability and arrived at his conclusion that she could not work based on
Petitioner's statements to him of her work history.
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II.

T H E COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE HEARING OFFICER'S FINDING
THAT DR. KNORPP'S TESTIMONY WAS CREDIBLE AND PERSUASIVE.

Because this Court grants the Board's H.O. substantial deference in determining
findings of fact, particularly facts involving the credibility of witnesses, the Board's
finding that "Dr. Scott Knorpp's testimony concerning Petitioner's alleged impairments
and disability was credible and persuasive," should not be disturbed. HR., at 383. It is
the province of the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve conflicting evidence, and
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the agency
to draw the inference. Albertsonsjnc., 854 P.2d 570 at 575. Dr. Knorpp conducted a
statutory independent medical exam consistent with the AMA and Utah Impairment
Guidelines. Yet, Petitioner spends a good portion of her argument attempting to discredit
Dr. Knorpp's testimony .10 See, Appellant's Brief, at 19-21, 37-42.
No one who comes to testify as a witness before the Board should be required to
endure the harassment and vitriol that Dr. Knorpp endured during this hearing. The Utah
Standards of Professionalism and Civility state, ". .. lawyers shall treat all other counsel,
parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in all proceedings in a courteous and
dignified manner." It continues, "in fulfilling a duty to represent a client vigorously as
lawyers, we must be mindful of our obligations to the administration of justice, which is a
truth seeking process designed to resolve human and societal problems in a rational, and
peaceful, and efficient manner." Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility.
From the moment of his arrival, Petitioner's counsel regarded Dr. Knorpp with
nothing but contempt in violation of the Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility.
As Dr. Knorpp sat down on the first day of the hearing, Petitioner's Counsel, with no
authority to enforce respect for the proceedings, screamed at Dr. Knorpp to show his
client proper respect, after Dr. Knorpp, without interrupting the proceedings, had
whispered "hello" to his colleague. See, TR. 14:2-25, 15:1-11. During his crossexamination of Dr. Knorpp, Petitioner's Counsel, without evidence, accused Dr. Knorpp
of bias and referred to him as "prostituting himself." TR. 107:20. Petitioner's Counsel
intentionally and repeatedly mispronounced Dr. Knorpp's name after having been told the
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Dr. Knorpp's opinion and expertise are above reproach. Dr. Knorpp graduated
with his medical degree from the University of Nevada School of Medicine in 1987 and
completed a year internship with St. Mary's Hospital and Medical Center in 1988. See,
TR. 64-65; HR., at 135. Dr. Knorpp completed his residency at the University of Utah in
the field of physical medicine and rehabilitation in 199 land became board certified in his
field in 1992. See, Id. For the past 13 years, Dr. Knorrp has been practicing in his field
of medicine. See, Id. It is evident from both Dr. Knorpp's testimony and his resume that
he has extensive experience in the field of physical medicine and rehabilitation. These
credentials bolster the Board's finding Dr. Knorpp's testimony credible and persuasive.
When Petitioner applied for long-term disability benefits, Dr. Knorpp was asked
by the Board's LTD Program to conduct an independent medical examination of
Petitioner, and opine on the level of Petitioner's objective medical impairment and
disability. Such an exam is specifically authorized under U.C.A. § 49-21-401(8), stating,
"The office may, at any time, have any eligible employee claiming disability examined by
a physician chosen by the office to determine if the eligible employee is totally disabled."
Dr. Knorpp performed his examination of Petitioner and made his report on February 27,
2003. See, HR. at 118-125.

correct pronunciation. Finally, in her closing argument, Petitioner' Counsel comparesd
accepting Dr. Knorpp's opinion to Germans who followed Adolf Hitler. See, HR. at 253254. Even now, Petitioner's Counsel has continued these distasteful personal attacks in
the Appellant Brief claiming that "Dr. Knorpp is an activist who expels the ill into the
wilderness to die. . ." Appellant's Brief, at 41. Such hyperbole calls into question all of
Petitioner's arguments.
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Dr. Knorpp took a thorough medical history from Petitioner and conducted a
physical examination in an attempt to objectify Petitioner's disability. See, Id. In
addition Dr. Knorpp tested Petitioner's subjective complaints for credibility and found her
to be less than credible, stating, " . . . 1 have some concerns that perhaps [Petitioner] was
volitionally attempting to add some flavor to her clinical examination." Id. at 124.
After reviewing Petitioner's history and conducting his examination Dr. Knorpp
opined:
. . . I am unable to objectify any neurologic, orthopedic or
musculoskeletal disorder that wold [sic] rightfully or
reasonably preclude this patient's resumption of productive
employment. More specifically, .. .[Petitioner's] clinical
examination does not lend itself to receptivity or easy
identification of any specific disorder, condition, disease or
pathology that would preclude a return to her employment
activities in a sedentary job position for the State of Utah.
Id.
Then, after quoting from the Utah Impairment Guidelines in reference to FMS and
CFS, Dr. Knorpp summarized:
. . . I am unable to identify any specific disease, disorder or
condition for which the patient would be precluded from
returning to productive employment. Stated otherwise, I find
no reason that the patient could not or should not return to her
work at the State of Utah in her sedentary position as a
Medicaid representative.
Id. at 125.
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Because Dr. Knorpp performed a medical examination which complies with both
the statute and the Utah Impairment Guidelines, his opinion is both credible and
persuasive. Thus, the Board received substantial evidence to support its finding.
In her attempt to strike Dr. Knorpp's testimony, Petitioner misapplies State v.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) regarding excludable expert testimony under Utah
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702. In both State v. Adams, 2000 UT. 42, 5 P.3d 642 (Utah
2000) and State v. Kelly, 2000 UT. 41, 1 P.3d 546 (Utah 2000) the Utah Supreme Court
held that the Rimmasch test requiring a foundation of reliability of scientific testimony is
inapplicable where "there is no plausible claim that the type of expert testimony offered
by the prosecution was based on novel scientific principles." Alder v. Bayer Corp.,
AGFA Division, 2002 UT. 115, 61 P.3d 1068, 1083-84 (Utah 2002), quoting, Kelly, 2000
UT. 41, 1 P.3d 546 at Tfl9. Although clearly a disagreement exists between Dr. Knorpp
and Petitioner regarding the medical standards for determining impairment:
disagreement among experts, even between the experts and
the judge is not a valid basis for exclusion of testimony. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made this clear in Kennedy v.
Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1998), stating:
Judges in jury trials should not exclude expert testimony
simply because they disagree with the conclusions of the
expert.... The test is whether or not the reasoning is
scientific and will assist the jury. If it satisfies these two
requirements, then it is a matter for the finder of fact to
decide what weight to accord the expert's testimony. In
arriving at a conclusion, the factfinder may be confronted
with opposing experts, additional tests, experiments, and
publication, all of which may increase or lessen the value
of the expert's testimony. But their presence should not
preclude admission of the expert's testimony- - they go to
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the weight, not the admissibility. Id. at 1230-31 (emphasis
added.) Therefore, we reaffirm our previous holdings that
the Rimmasch test applies only to novel scientific methods
and techniques.
AMer, at 1084, 60.
Because Dr. Knorpp conducted an evaluation which would assist the H.O. in
making a decision whether Petitioner suffered from an objective medical impairment, his
testimony goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. As such, Dr. Knorpp's
testimony is admissible and the H.O. committed no error is finding it credible and
persuasive.
In addition, contrasting Dr. Knorpp with Petitioner's expert, (who was not her
treating physician) Dr. Beales, leads one to believe Dr. Knorpp's opinion regarding
Petitioner's alleged disability is reasonable.
Dr. Beales is not board certified in his specialty, internal medicine. See, TR. 43.
While Dr. Beales may have experience in internal medicine, he has not been trained in
physical medicine and rehabilitation and is unfamiliar with medically accepted guidelines
in determining impairment. Dr. Beales retired from the practice of medicine several years
ago, See, TR.358:1, and only conducts physical evaluations from his home. Dr. Beales
does not maintain an office. See, TR. 357:22-25. Within the past year Dr. Beales only
conducted one other medical evaluation. See, TR' 358:18. In addition to these problems
Dr. Beales has a bias concerning FMS and CFS because his son has been diagnosed with
CFS. TR: 45-9-11. Therefore, while Dr. Beales is a nice person, if there is a physician
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who was or competent at the hearing, it was Dr. Knorpp, not Dr. Beales.
Although, Dr. Beales testified he received no known financial remuneration for his
opinion in this case, Dr. Beales does receive personal, academic and professional
benefits. First, Dr. Beales has become a FMS and CFS physician advocate. At the
hearing Dr. Beales stated that he only testifies on behalf of FMS or CFS patients claiming
to be disabled. See, TR. 43-44. This probably stems from his son being diagnosed with
CFS and receiving Social Security Disability benefits. See, TR. 45: 9-17. If CFS is
somehow discredited, or disregarded as a legitimate diagnosis, then it reflects poorly on
his son who claims to be disabled due to CFS.
Additionally, Dr. Beales, and particularly Dr. Lucinda Bateman, have a personal
academic and professional interest in legitimizing FMS and CFS. Dr. Beales only sees
FMS and CFS patients today to prepare for litigation as an expert witness. Meanwhile
Dr. Bateman's entire practice is devoted to these syndromes. Both Dr. Beales and Dr.
Bateman speak and attend conferences related to these syndromes and receive
compensation for their services. If these syndromes are not found to be credible disabling
illnesses, these physicians would suffer financial, personal, and academic embarrassment
and loss.
Hence, because of Dr. Beales risk of personal, financial and academic loss and
embarrassment, he has much more a risk of bias in his testimony than Dr. Knorpp who
does not have these academic and social pressures. As such, the Board was reasonable in
accepting Dr. Knorpp's testimony over Dr. Beales.
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Lastly, the Board correctly determined Dr. Knorpp's opinion was more persuasive
than Petitioner's treating physicians who failed to testify at the hearing. Petitioner
attempts to argue that her attending physician's opinions should be given more weight
than Dr. Knorpp. See, Appellant's Brief, at 34. Ironically, Petitioner quotes the Utah
Impairment Guidelines (after earlier stating they are irrelevant) stating, "the attending
physician is deemed the person most knowledgeable regarding the condition, progress
and final status of the injured employee." HR. at 373. However, Petitioner failed to
provide the remainder of this quote from the Guidelines which significantly adds to its
meaning. It continues, "therefore the treating physician is encouraged to render the final
impairment rating." HR., at 373. (emphasis added.) In this instance, Petitioner's treating
physicians did not provide any impairment rating or basis for determining that she is
disabled.
The United States Supreme Court recently held concerning giving additional
weight to treating physicians,
the assumption that the opinions of a treating physician warrant greater
credit than the opinions of plan consultants may make scant sense when, for
example, the relationship between the claimant and the treating physician
has been of short duration, or when a specialist engaged by the plan has
expertise the treating physician lacks. And if a consultant engaged by a
plan may have an 'incentive' to make a finding of "not disabled," so a
treating physician, in a close case, may favor a finding of "disabled."
Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 832,123 S. Ct. 1965,155 L.Ed.2d
1034 (2003). Therefore, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court, the Board's lack
of deference to treating physicians was not error. Thus, just because a physician is a
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treating physician does not automatically give them additional credibility. Therefore, the
Board was correct in not giving deference to these physicians.
III.

THE HEARING OFFICER PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL OF PETITIONER'S
EVIDENCE IN FINDING SHE FAILED TO MEET THE STATUTORY
STANDARD FOR "TOTAL DISABILITY" UNDER U.C.A.§49-21-102(11)(A).

Petitioner cannot point to anything in the record to suggest that the H.O.did not
consider all of her evidence in reaching his decision. Petitioner erroneously concludes
that the H.O. disregarded the Social Security determination and her medical records.
However, Petitioner failed to point to anything specific in the record to support this claim.
See, Appellant's Brief, at 37.
To support her argument regarding the persuasiveness of a Social Security
determination, Petitioner cites to a case involving an ERISA plan which denied long-term
disability benefits. See, Appellant's Brief, at 37, quoting, Austin v. Continental Casualty
Company, 216 F.Supp.2d 550 (W.D.N.C. 2002). In Austin, the court opines, in dicta that
an ERISA plan administer may find a Social Security vocation determination helpful in
reaching a decision. See, Austin, 216 F. Supp. 2d 550 at 556. The court however, did not
provide a specific ruling which found that an administrator is bound by a Social
Security determination.
Petitioner cannot point to anything in the record which suggests that the H.O. did
not review or use her Social Security determination in reaching his decision. The record
shows that the H.O. considered all of Petitioner's evidence consisting of the testimony
provided by all of the witnesses at the hearing and all documents admitted into evidence
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including the Social Security determination. See, HR. at 384; See also, HT. 381:17-18
(Exhibit B accepted into evidence it includes Social Security determination).
Petitioner also erroneously argues that the H.O. failed to consider her testimony
regarding her subjective complaints, primarily those regarding her worst problems as pain
and fatigue. See, TR. 21:17-18, 22:7, 18-23, 177: 11-25, 178:1-13 As discussed supra
page 14, her subjective complaints should not be taken into consideration unless an
objective medical impairment is found. In this case, the H.O. did not find an objective
medical impairment, therefore, he was correct in not finding Petitioner's subjective
complaints persuasive of impairment or disability.
In conclusion, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the H.O. did not
consider all of Petitioner's evidence including her SSA determination and subjective
complaints. However, the H.O. was correct in determining that Petitioner "failed to
present any non-hearsay evidence proving she suffered from any 'objective medical
impairment' resulting from an injury or illness based on accepted medical tests or
findings." HR. at 385.

IV.

T H E BOARD'S ORDER WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE HEARING OFFICER'S
DECISION.

The H.O.'s Decision was consistent with the Order adopted by the H.O. and the
Board. Petitioner makes no valid argument in claiming that the Order was not consistent
with the H.O.'s Decision for three reasons: 1) the H.O. ruled on Petitioner's ultimate issue
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of whether she was entitled to long-term disability benefits; 2) the Petitioner did not point
to any instance where the H.O.'s Decision was inconsistent with the Board's Order; and
3) the Petitioner failed to provide any evidence of bias on the part of the H.O. in making
his decision.
First, the H.O.'s Decision clearly ruled on the ultimate issue of Petitioner, namely,
whether she was entitled to long-term disability benefits under the statute. Petitioner's
request for board action only requests, "payment of long-term disability benefits." HR.,
at 5. As such, the H.O.'s Decision clearly ruled on the only ultimate issue presented by
the Petitioner in denying her long-term disability benefits.
Second, Petitioner failed to point to any instance where the Order adopted by the
H.O. was inconsistent with the H.O.'s Decision. Although the Order was longer than the
Decision, and used different language, the Order was consistent with the Decision in
every way. Because the H.O. requested that the Board's Counsel prepare a proposed
Order based on the Decision,11 presumably the H.O. did not expect the Order to be a word
for word recital of the H.O.'s Decision. Thus, the fact that the Order contained some
additional language to the Decision should not surprise the Petitioner or this Court. In

11 Having the prevailing party's legal counsel draft a proposed Order is not error. It is
common practice in Utah for the court, "to ask counsel for the prevailing party to draw
proposed findings of fact. That practice is so general as to be said to be the universal
practice in this jurisdiction." Erkman v. Civil Service Comm'n of Provo, 114 Utah 228,
236; 198 P.2d 238, 244 (Utah 1948). The Court continued, "it would not be seriously
contended that such proposed findings, when approved and adopted by the court, are not
proper findings of fact sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement [to make findings of
fact] . . . " Id
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order to show some inconsistency between the Decision and the Order, the Petitioner
must show a material factual or legal discrepancy between the two documents. This is
more than just pointing to different words and phrases used in the two documents, she
must show an intent by the H.O. to rule differently in the Decision than the Order.
Petitioner cannot show such a discrepancy because both the Decision and the Order are
factually and legally consistent.
Nevertheless, even if the Decision is considered to be inconsistent with the
Board's Order, it is not reversible error because the Order was specifically reviewed and
adopted by the H.O. Petitioner had and took the opportunity to review the proposed
Order prior to its being adopted by the H.O., and made objections to it. See, HR. at 37880. This review of the proposed Order allowed the Petitioner the ability to explain to the
H.O. any perceived "inconsistencies" between the Decision and the Order. The H.O.,
after reviewing Petitioner's objections, then adopted the Order without changes. Thus,
because Petitioner had the opportunity to object

1?

to the proposed Order prior to the H.O.

adopting the Order, the Order became the final appealable ruling of the H.O. after it was
signed by the H.O. and approved by the Board.
Third, Petitioner can point to no evidence that the H.O. is biased, or that Board or
its Counsel predetermined this case. Although Petitioner correctly states that the Utah

12 One court has even held that in cases where opposing counsel did not have the
opportunity to review and refute the proposed findings of fact, this did not invalidate the
order signed by the court. See, Barnes v. L.M. Masses Inc., 612 So.2d 120, 123 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So.2d 81 (La. 1993).
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Retirement Systems hires a H.O. under U.C.A. § 49-11-613 to adjudicate claims against
the Board, this is not evidence of bias. District court, court of appeals and Supreme Court
judges all are hired/selected by the State. No one seriously contends that these judges are
biased in favor of the State because of this association.
In addition, Petitioner's allegation that "in his tenure with the Agency, the [H.O.]
has never ruled in favor of a claimant[,]" is blatantly untrue. Appellant's Brief, at 43.
Although unsurprisingly, the H.O. has never ruled in favor of a disability claimant with
FMS or CFS, it is simply untrue that the H.O. has never ruled in favor of any claimant
against the Board. Therefore, because Petitioner cannot prove or point to any evidence of
bias or impropriety in the Board's hearing process, the Court ought to reject Petitioner's
implications that the H.O. was biased in adopting the Order.
In conclusion, because the Board's Order was consistent with the H.O.'s Decision,
the H.O. did not err in adopting the proposed Order. Yet, even if the Order was
inconsistent in some way with the H.O.'s original Decision, the Petitioner had amble
opportunity to object to the proposed Order to point out any perceive discrepancies. That
the H.O. adopted the Order after reviewing Petitioner's objections is not error.

CONCLUSION
The Board hereby asks this Court to reject Petitioner's appeal in its entirety.
Petitioner failed to show that she meets the statutory standard for receiving long-term
disability benefits because she cannot prove an objective medical impairment.
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Additionally, Petitioner failed to prove that the H.O. did not consider all of her evidence
in making his determination. Finally, Petitioner failed to show that the Order was not
competent, complete and contained reversible error.
DATED this 6%

day of February, 2005.

D5WiDlf HANSEN
Howard, Phillips & Andersen

42

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this th^ffi
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Loren M. Lambert
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
266 East 7200 South
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CORRECTIONS TO PAGE NUMBERS OF CASES CITED
Alder v. Bayer Corporation, 61 P.3d 1068 (Utah 2002), the page number
Petitioner's Counsel cites to is actually 1083.
Industrial Power Contractors v Industrial Comm., 832 P.2d 477 (Ut. Ct. App.
1992), the page number Petitioner's Counsel cites to is actually 479.
Layton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1984), the page number Petitioner's
Counsel cites to is actually 442-443 and it is a direct quote from Landess v.
Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187, 1190 (8th Cir. 1974).
Mickles v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 918 (4th Cir. 1994), the page number Petitioner's
Counsel cites to is actually 921.
Morton v. State Tax Comm., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), Petitioner's Counsel cites
to pages 588-589, however, upon review of the case cannot find where Court of
Appeals held that de novo standard of review should apply.
Sanderson v. Continental Casualty Corp., 279 F. Supp.2d 466 (D.Del. 2003),
Petitioner's Counsel cites to 417, however, there is no page 417.
State v. Tucker, 96 P.3d 368 (Ut. App. 2004), the page numbers Petitioner's
Counsel cites to are 370-371.

CORRECTIONS TO CITATIONS MADE TO HEARING RECORD (HR)
AND HEARING TRANSCRIPT (HT)
First Issue on Appeal at Page 1, the correct citation is Hearing Transcript (HT)
59:5-11, 69:9-21, 70:4-8, 71:2-9, 102:4-12 and Hearing Record (HR) 233-241,
335, 339-347, 348-349, 358-359, 362-363.
Fourth Issue on Appeal at Page 2, the correct citation is HT 105:3-25, 106:1, HR
241-257, 347-348, 359-362.
Summary of Facts, 6. at page 7, the correct citation is HR 221 Exhibit B pp 00191.
Summary of Facts, 7. at page 9, Petitioner's Counsel mischaracterizes Dr.
Knorpp's testimony found in HT 67:11-18, 139:8-18.

Summary of Facts, 8. at page 9-10, the correct citation is HR 174.
Summary of Facts, 19. at page 12, Petitioner's Counsel mischaracterizes Dr.
Knorpp's testimony found in HT 292:13-20.
Summary of Facts, 23. at page 13, the correct citation is HR 172.
Summary of Facts, 24. at page 13, Petitioner's Counsel mischaracterizes Dr.
Knorpp's testimony found in HT 239:5-11.
Summary of Facts, 27. at page 14, Petitioner's Counsel cites to HT 307:8-13,
however, this is not what Dr. Knorpp testified to.
Summary of Facts, 34. at page 15-16, the correct citation is HT 100:14-18 and HT
116:15-22.
Summary of Facts, 35. at page 16, Petitioner's Counsel mischaracterizes Dr.
Beales testimony found in HT 331:16-20, 333, 334:1-6. Dr. Beales did not make
statements he merely agreed with statements read to him by Petitioner's Counsel.
Summary of Facts, 36. at page 16, Petitioner's Counsel mischaracterizes Dr.
Knorpp's testimony found in HT 251:16-18.
Summary of Facts, 58. at page 21, Petitioner's Counsel mischaracterizes Dr.
Knorpp's testimony found in HT 122:5-6.
Summary of Facts, 59. at page 21, This alleged fact is completely unfounded.
Petitioner's Counsel has mischaracterized Petitioner's testimony found in HT 146161, 165-171. In fact Petitioner admits in Summary of Fact, 64. that "her
employer tried to accommodate her. . ."
Summary of Facts, 61. at page 22, Petitioner's Counsel mischaracterizes Dr.
Beale's testimony found in HT 26:21-25.
Summary of Facts, 67. at page 23, This alleged fact is completely unfounded.
There is nothing in the record which suggests that the Hearing Officer did not take
into consideration that Petitioner was found disabled by SSA.
Argument at page 26, paragraph 2, the correct citation is HR 383, 386.
Argument at page 27, paragraph 1, the correct citation is HR 375, 386.
Argument at page 28, paragraph 3, the correct citation is HR 385.

Argument at page 36, paragraph 3, Petitioner's Counsel mischaracterizes Dr.
Knorpp's testimony found in HT 86:9 and HT 122:5-6.
Argument at page 40, paragraph 2, Petitioner's Counsel mischaracterizes this as
Dr. Knorpp's testimony, however, it is the testimony of Dr. Beale's found in HT
17:22-25, 18:1-12, 23:22-25. Additionally, Petitioner's Counsel mischaracterizes
Dr. Knorpp's testimony found in HT 224:1-13.
Argument at page 41, paragraph 1, the correct citation is HR 331, Exh. B at 179.
Argument at page 41, paragraph 1, Petitioner's Counsel cites to HR 246 indicating
that this direct quote comes from the CDC Clinical Course of CFS, however, this
cite to the HR is actually Petitioner's closing argument and Petitioner's Counsel
fails to cite correctly to the CDC Clinical Course of CFS in the closing argument.
Argument at page 44, paragraph 1, Petitioner's Counsel cites to HR. 263-297 in an
attempt to support this argument. However, the orders which were provided to
Petitioner were specific cases involving FMS and CFS. See, HR. at 229-230.

ADDENDUM
B

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

LINDA MALAN HILTON,
Petitioner,
ORDER
v.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
LONG TERM DISABILITY PROGRAM,

File#: 03-16D

Respondent.

A hearing was held on May 6th and June 1st, 2004, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on
Petitioner's Request for Board Action. The Petitioner was represented by Loren Lambert. The
Board was represented by David B. Hansen. Based upon the evidence in this matter and the legal
memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner worked as an employee of the State of Utah as a Health Program

Specialist II. See, Petitioner's Hearing Exhibit B-15, at 166.

1

2.

Petitioner testified that her last day of work with the State of Utah as a Health

Program Specialist II was October 1, 2002. See, Hearing Transcript [Hereinafter "TIT] 173:1315.
3.

Petitioner presented into evidence a job description from the State of Utah which

indicates that her position as a Health Program Specialist II was a sedentary position. See,
Petitioner's Exhibit B-15. The physical demands of this position consisted primarily of sitting
and included some walking, standing, bending, and carrying light items. See, Id, at 166-167.
4.

The LTD Program denied Petitioner's application for a two-year own occupation

long-term disability benefit because she failed to show she suffers from an objective medical
impairment preventing her from performing her regular occupation.
5.

At the hearing, Petitioner's expert witness, Dr. Landon Beales, testified that there

are tests which might provide some objective markers for identifying fibromyalgia and chronic
fatigue syndrome, but that most of these tests have not been performed on Petitioner. See, TR.
343:16-25, 344:1-25 (Dr. Beals cannot remember if MRI was performed on Petitioner), 345:1-25,
346:l-25(no testing done on Petitioner's anti-viral pathways), 347:1 ^(neuropsychological exam
done, but no reason why Petitioner cannot work based on cognitive problems), 348:l-25(did not
see lab work to see if blood tests were done to test growth hormone secretion or adrenal hormone
measurements), 351:13-25, 352:1-25, 353:l-25(no tilt table test performed), 354:1-25, 355: 13(no ultrasound performed on nasal cavity).
6.

Both Petitioner and Dr. Beales testified that the worst conditions Petitioner suffers

from are pain and fatigue. See, TR^21.T7-18, 22:7, 18-23, 177: 11-25, 178:1-13. Dr. Beales
testified, "There's no good objective measurement of pain, of fatigue . . .," TR.360:12-13. Dr.
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Beales testified that he relied on Petitioner's self-reported symptoms in forming his opinion
regarding Petitioner's disability due to pain and fatigue. . . TR.. 60: 1-7.
7.

Dr. Beales testified that he was not familiar with either the American Medical

Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment ("AMA Guidelines") or the Utah
Impairment Guidelines. See, TR. 59:15-19, 60: 8-10. Dr. Beales did not provide any other
guidelines or standards that could be used in making his determination on Petitioner's disability.
8.

Dr. Beales failed to provide Petitioner with an impairment rating using any

accepted objective criteria, such as the AMA or Utah Impairment Guidelines. Impairment ratings
are the standard used in the medical community to determine disability. See, TR. 60: 1-7.
9.

Dr. Knorpp is board certified in physical medicine and rehabilitation. See,

Respondent's Hearing Exhibit 1. Dr. Knorpp is proficient with the AMA Guidelines and the
Utah Impairment Guidelines in determining medical impairment and disability. See, TR. 65:1516. Dr. Knorpp testified that the AMA guidelines have been supplemented with the Utah
Impairment Guidelines in Utah to establish disability due to pain and fatigue. See, TR. 70:13-24.
Dr. Knorpp testified that based upon these guidelines as well as the disability standard defined in
Title 49 of the Utah Code, he could not find anything that could objectively show that Petitioner
would qualify for an impairment that would lead to a disability. See, TR. 105:18-21, 25, 106:1.
10.

Dr. Scott Knorpp's testimony concerning Petitioner's alleged impairment and

disability was credible and persuasive. Dr. Knorpp affirmatively testified that Petitioner did not
meet the definition of "total disability," under the definition in Utah Code Ann.§ 49-21-102(11).
See,TR. 105:18-21,25,106:1.
11.

Petitioner submitted into evidence a Neuropsychological Evaluation performed on

Petitioner on February 20, 2003, by Dr. Elaine Clark, a licensed psychologist. See, Petitioner's
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Exhibit B-ll. Dr. Clark concluded, "this evaluation failed to provide any evidence that would
suggest Mrs. Hilton is disabled from work for psychological or cognitive reasons." Id. at 135-136.
12.

The Hearing Officer reviewed and considered all of Petitioner's medical records

in making this determination and Order.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner's claim appealed the LTD Program's denial of a two-year long-term

disability benefit.
2.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-613(2), "the hearing officer shall be hired by

the executive director after consultation with the Board and shall follow the procedures of Title
63, Chapter 46B, Administrative Procedures Act, except as specifically modified by this Title."
No evidence was presented which shows the Board failed to follow any of its procedures in
conducting this hearing.
3.

Petitioner proved no bias in these proceedings. The procedure for administrative

hearings has been determined by statute and upheld by Utah Courts.
4.

Petitioner proved no bias on the part of the hearing officer in these proceedings.

Evidence of previous decisions by a hearing officer does not create bias See, Prickett v. Amoco
Oil Co., 31 Fed.Appx. 608, 611 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding that, a judge enjoys a presumption of
honesty and integrity which is rebutted only by a showing of "some substantial countervailing
reason to conclude that a decision maker is actually biased with respect to factual issues being
adjudicated.").
5.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4), "the moving party in any proceeding

brought under this section shall bear the burden of proof." Here, as it was in Murphy, the Court
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of Appeals held, "the plain language of section 49-1-610(4) clearly imposes the burden of proof
on (Petitioner) to demonstrate that she has a 'total disability.'" Murphy v. Utah State Ret. Bd.,
2004 Ut. App. 109, at 2. In long-term disability cases, Petitioner bears the burden to prove she
meets the criteria under Title 49, Chapter 21 to be eligible for a long-term disability benefit.
6.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8(c), in administrative hearings, the hearing

officer "may not exclude evidence only because it is hearsay." However, hearsay evidence
cannot be the sole basis for a contested finding of fact unless that evidence is admissible under
the Utah Rules of Evidence. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10(3).
7.

"Total disability" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 49-21-102(1 l)(a) as "the

complete inability, due to objective medical impairment, whether physical or mental, to engage
in the eligible employee's regular occupation during the elimination period and the first 24
months of disability benefits."
8.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §49-21-102(6), "Objective medical impairment," is

defined as "an impairment resulting from an injury or illness which is diagnosed by a physician
and which is based on accepted objective medical tests or findings rather than subjective
complaints."
9.

Petitioner failed to present any non-hearsay evidence proving she suffered from

any "objective medical impairment" resulting from an injury or illness based on accepted medical
tests or findings. Although Petitioner provided evidence of diagnoses, Petitioner failed to
provide any evidence showing that she was objectively impaired due to these conditions.

1 U.C.A. § 49-1-610 was renumbered in 2002. It now appears as U.C.A. § 49-11-613.
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10.

Because Petitioner failed to provide any objective medical impairment,

Petitioner does not meet the statutory standard of "total disability." and does not qualify for longterm disability benefits.
11.

Although it is not mandatory that a petitioner use the AMA Guidelines and/or the

Utah Impairment Guidelines to prove impairment, a petitioner must prove "objective medical
impairment" through "accepted objective medical tests or findings." Since the AMA Guidelines
and the Utah Impairment Guidelines are the standards currently used by the medical community
to determine impairment, these are reasonable guidelines to be used to determine the level of
impairment.
12.

No evidence was presented by Petitioner to indicate that she qualifies for an

objective impairment rating pursuant to the AMA Guidelines, the Utah Impairment Guidelines,
or any other accepted objective criteria.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's appeal for two-year own occupation longterm disability benefits is denied.

BOARD RECONSIDERATION
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive
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director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request withm twenty (20) days of
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
If Petitioner is aggrieved with the final Board order, she may seek a judicial review within
thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. Petitioner
shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. All
petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-17.

APPROVED AS TO FORM

DATED this / 5

day of October, 2004.
/

/iames L. Barker. Jr.
^Adjudicative Hearing Officer

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the Adjudicative
Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board.
Dated this 2> 1 day of October, 2004.
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

J&ftn Lunt, Board President
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this the Z-"? day of October, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the above Order, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Loren Lambert
Arrow Legal Solutions, LLC
266 East 7200 South
Midvale,UT 84047
David B. Hansen
Howard, Phillips & Andersen
560 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

PcfrfrU.
fteeec Jensen
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